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We examine communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. 
Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but 
obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we 
introduce two realistic features of communication by making the sending of messages optional 
and costly. Even small costs dramatically reduce message use, but efficient coordination of 
actions occurs with similar frequency to that observed under costless communication. By varying 
communication costs we corroborate several predictions from a theoretical analysis based on 
forward induction. Our results indicate that, for some levels of communication costs, explicit 
communication may be unnecessary for efficient coordination; instead, players simply need to 
know that the option to send messages was available. Thus, the relationship between 
communication and coordination is more complex than suggested by prior research. 
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I. Introduction 
  An extensive literature on coordination games explores the conditions under which 
independent agents can efficiently coordinate their actions. Much of this research consists of 
laboratory experiments that identify varying conditions under which players select an efficient 
equilibrium from a set of multiple possible equilibrium outcomes (for reviews, see Camerer 
(2003, Chapter 7) and Devetag & Ortmann (2007)). 
One commonly investigated type of coordination game involves a tradeoff between 
equilibria that are efficient and those that provide greater payoff security (Van Huyck, et al., 
1990; Cooper et al., 1990). For example, the two-player coordination game in Table 1, studied by 
Cooper et al. (1992) and often referred to as the “stag hunt” game, has this property. The two 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game are a payoff-dominant one (2,2) that yields the highest 
possible payoff for both players and a risk-dominant one (1,1) that obtains by players selecting 
the action that yields both the highest minimum payoff and the highest payoff against a 
uniformly randomizing opponent (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). 
These kinds of games, which can be generalized to include more players and actions 
(Van Huyck, et al., 1990; Weber, et al., 2001; Brandts and Cooper, 2006), represent useful 
models of varied economic activity, such as investment or production under complementarities 
(Bryant, 1983; Hirschleifer, 1983; Knez and Camerer, 1994). But, despite the intuitive appeal of 
payoff-dominance and efficiency as an equilibrium-selection criterion, considerable laboratory 
evidence indicates that tacit efficient coordination is often difficult. For example, in the game in 
Table 1, the secure and inefficient (1,1) outcome regularly obtains when players play repeatedly 
and are re-matched across rounds (Cooper et al., 1992). Similarly, large groups in variants of the 
game with more players and actions rarely coordinate on the efficient equilibrium tacitly (Van 
Huyck, et al., 1990 & 1991). Identifying mechanisms that aid coordination on efficient equilibria 
is therefore potentially important for understanding how to obtain efficiency in analogous real-
world coordination problems. 
  One natural way to facilitate efficient coordination might be to allow pre-play 
communication among players. Indeed, several experimental studies demonstrate that requiring 
all players to send non-binding pre-play (“cheap talk”) messages, which correspond to possible 
actions in the game, can increase coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium (Cooper et 2 
 
al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007).
1 A stylized fact observed in these experiments can be 
described as follows: when both players in the game in Table 1 must send a message of either 
“1” or “2” prior to playing the game, both players send message “2” and coordinate on the (2,2) 
equilibrium. The same result regularly obtains when there are more players and actions, as in a 
minimum-effort, or “weak-link,” coordination game (Blume and Ortmann, 2007).  
  Because the introduction of real-world features, such as pre-play communication, often 
yields efficient coordination in laboratory experiments on coordination games, one might argue 
that the frequency of coordination failure outside the laboratory is likely to be mitigated by the 
presence of such factors (Devetag & Ortmann, 2007). Since pre-play messages dramatically 
reduce coordination failure, the availability of communication in most real-world contexts 
implies that coordination problems analogous to the one in Table 1 are likely to be easily 
efficiently resolved. 
However, in considering the extent to which communication solves coordination 
problems, one must remember that the amount of communication used in previous experiments 
to obtain high rates of efficiency in these games is perhaps unrealistic outside the laboratory. In 
the communication experiments above, efficiency typically obtains from i) all players sending 
messages indicating the intention to play the strategy corresponding to the efficient equilibrium, 
ii) all players observing messages from all other players, iii) this kind of intensive 
communication taking place every time the game is played, and iv) common knowledge of this 
communication structure. Under such stringent conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
communication is highly effective. But such extreme forms of communication are unlikely to be 
found in many situations outside the laboratory. 
When communication does not satisfy the above conditions, it is often much less 
effective at producing coordination on the efficient equilibrium. For example, Cooper et al. 
(1992) conduct a treatment in which only one player sends a pre-play message and find 
significantly lower levels of efficient coordination than when both players send messages. 
Similarly, Weber et al. (2001) find that communication from one player in a multi-player variant 
                                                 
1 For theoretical analyses of the role of communication in these kinds of coordination games, see, for example, 
Farrell (1988), Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Ellingsen and Östling (2010). See also, Crawford and Sobel (1982) and 
Crawford and Haller (1990) for related discussions. 3 
 
of the stag hunt game has little effect at improving efficiency.
2 Using a similar game, Chaudhuri, 
et al., (2009) find that inter-generational communication only yields efficiency under the extreme 
communication and information conditions described above. 
The starting point for our research is this observation: The universal communication 
shown to be highly effective for obtaining efficient coordination in previous experiments is 
likely to be rare outside the laboratory. Our research explores the effectiveness of an alternative 
communication framework, which relaxes the requirement that players send pre-play messages 
and therefore makes the laboratory consistent with many non-laboratory environments in which 
communication is voluntary, irregular, and costly. By introducing communication costs, our 
experiment also creates situations in which the use of pre-play messages is inefficient, as in 
many naturally occurring contexts. 
More precisely, we depart from the above seminal experiments by Cooper et al. (1992) in 
two important ways. First, rather than exogenously imposing a communication structure on a 
group by deciding who sends messages and requiring those people to do so in every period, we 
make the choice of whether to send a message endogenous, by allowing players to decide 
whether they want to send a message in each period.
3 Second, we require those players who 
choose to send messages to incur costs to do so. That is, we make communication costly to 
reflect the fact that real-world communication often imposes costs – e.g., explicit communication 
costs or an opportunity cost of time – on those who use it.  
Importantly, the kind of communication we introduce in our experiments changes the 
efficiency properties of equilibrium outcomes. Since messages are costly and players are not 
required to send messages, efficiency no longer obtains when explicit communication is used to 
obtain the (2,2) outcome in the game in Table 1. Such an outcome is Pareto-dominated by 
obtaining the same (2,2) game outcome without the use of explicit communication, i.e., tacitly. 
This applies to many non-laboratory environments, where costs associated with using 
communication mean that its use necessarily diminishes efficiency. Of course, evidence from 
prior experiments, discussed above, suggests that tacit coordination is rare and difficult in such 
                                                 
2 For theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of unilateral vs. multilateral communication, see Ellingsen and Östling 
(2010). Also, other experimental evidence provides instances in which one-way communication yields high levels of 
efficiency (Charness, 2000; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002; Brandts and Cooper, 2007) or even out-performs two-way 
communication (Burton, et al., 2005). 
3 Our paper is related to recent theoretical research that explores endogenous information acquisition in coordination 
games, as when players must decide which, of many possible, coordinating signals to which to attend (Dewan and 
Myatt, 2008; Myatt and Wallace, forthcoming), 4 
 
games. Perhaps, then, truly efficient (message-free) coordination is unobtainable, and the best 
one can hope for is for players to coordinate their actions in the game efficiently, but only while 
incurring the inefficient costs associated with using pre-play messages.  
To preview our findings, in light of the previous experimental evidence our main result is 
somewhat surprising. Despite the fact that tacit communication is rare in previous experiments, 
and in one of our baseline conditions in which subjects are not allowed to communicate, we find 
that it occurs regularly when subjects choose to forgo costly communication. That is, when we 
make the choice to send a message both endogenous and costly, we find that subjects generally 
opt not to send messages, but that they subsequently coordinate their actions efficiently with high 
frequency. The difference between treatments is evident from the first time subjects play the 
game. 
Importantly, however, the above efficient coordination with forgone message use only 
occurs when message costs are low enough that sending a message is not a dominated strategy. 
That is, when message costs are low enough that subjects might reasonably use explicit pre-play 
communication to facilitate coordination, tacit coordination on the efficient equilibrium in the 
game occurs without subjects actually having to use messages. However, when message costs 
are high enough that no one should ever employ pre-play communication, then not using it does 
not help obtain efficient coordination in the game. Thus, the absence of messages means 
different things based on how they could have been used or whether they were possible. 
Intuitively, therefore, one can summarize our main finding as follows: Players are reassured in 
the coordination game in Table 1, absent any pre-play messages, simply by knowing that their 
opponent could have (reasonably) used pre-play messages to facilitate coordination. 
Our results are consistent with a theoretical analysis based on forward-induction, in 
which players infer from the absence of “reasonably costly” messages that the other player 
intends to play the efficient action. Thus, knowing that the other player could have 
communicated, if she felt it necessary, is sufficient to provide the reassurance necessary to yield 
efficient coordination. Our results are important as they indicate that, in real-world settings 
where pre-play messages are costly, one may observe significant efficient coordination without 5 
 
reliance on such messages.
4 This constitutes a significant departure from prior research, which 
suggests that efficient coordination is difficult without explicit pre-play communication. 
  The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a theoretical analysis 
that yields predictions for our experiment. Sections III and IV present the experimental design 
and results, respectively. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses 
Our analyses and experiment modify the game in Table 1 in two ways. First, we 
introduce an initial stage in which both players simultaneously decide whether to send no 
message, or to send a message of “1” or “2” to the other player. Both players then observe any 
message sent by the other player, before selecting an action in the second-stage coordination 
game. Second, we introduce a cost of sending a message,   ≥ 0, which is not incurred when a 
player chooses to send no message. We refer to the special case when c = 0 as costless messages. 
The primary focus of our analysis and experiment deals with situations in which   ∈ (0,200), 
meaning that pre-play communication is costly but can be supported as part of an equilibrium 
strategy (i.e., sending a message is not dominated). We refer to such a situation as one involving 
“reasonable” communication costs. We also consider the case where   > 200, meaning that 
sending a message is possible but dominated – i.e., “unreasonable” message costs. Whether 
message costs are above or below 200 significantly affects both our theoretical analysis and the 
experimental results. We begin by considering the case of reasonable message costs (  ∈
0,200 ), which is the focus of our study, and return later to the cases with costless 
communication (c = 0) and unreasonable message costs (  > 200).  
In the game modified by voluntary communication, each player has 24 possible pure 
strategies, involving three possible message-stage choices (no message, “1”, “2”) and eight 
                                                 
4 Two recent experimental papers explore different kinds of costly pre-play communication in coordination games. 
Manzini, Sadrieh and Vriend (2009) consider pre-play communication unrelated to game strategies – i.e., “smiles” 
that players can send to one another prior to playing the game. The use of smiles, though infrequent, slightly 
increases the frequency with which players select higher (more efficient) strategies, but this does not translate into 
better coordination because of the infrequency with which subjects use smiles and the small effect of messages. A 
treatment with costly smiles yields significantly reduced use of these messages (less than 1 percent of cases result in 
both players smiling), though the ambiguous benefit of costless smiles make it difficult to predict what should 
happen when costs are introduced. Fehr (2011) finds that players infrequently vote to impose a costly 
communication regime on all players, prior to merging two three-person groups playing a coordination game, 
resulting in coordination failure. This research suggests that people fail to properly anticipate the benefit of costly 
pre-play messages. This contrasts with our main prediction (from the next section), which suggests that players will 
fail to send messages because they are unnecessary when costly, at least in the two-player game we study here. 6 
 
possible actions in the second-stage game (a choice of 1 or 2 for each possible message-stage 
choice by the opponent). We restrict our attention to the most intuitively plausible and interesting 
actions and outcomes. Call an equilibrium semantically consistent if messages are used in 
agreement with their semantic meaning. We restrict attention to the three equilibrium outcomes 
that are supported by pure, symmetric, and semantically consistent equilibria.
5 When   ∈
(0,200), there are three such outcomes: i) players send no message and take action 1, ii) players 
send message “2” and take action 2, and iii) players send no message and take action 2. Only the 
third case is efficient, as it yields both players the highest payoff from the game without 
incurring message costs. 
Given our focus on semantically consistent equilibria, it makes sense to completely 
eliminate message “1” from the formal analysis of the game. To see this, observe that the only 
reason for players who maximize material payoffs to send a costly message is to induce action 2. 
Using message “1” with the intent to induce action 2 would violate our semantic consistency 
condition. Finally, once the use of message “1” with the intent to induce action 2 has been 
removed from consideration, there is no reason for materially motivated players to send message 
“1” at all.
6  
With this in mind we focus our analysis on a game in which only the options of not 
sending a message or of sending message “2” are available. This results in the game with 8 pure 
strategies described in Table 2. A player who uses strategy, Mij, sends a message, takes action i 
if he receives a message and takes action j if he does not receive a message. Similarly Nij stands 
for the strategy of not sending a message, responding to a message with action i and taking 
action j if no message is received.  
Note that, like the two pure-strategy equilibria in the original game without 
communication (Table 1), in the game modified by reasonable communication costs (  ∈
(0,200)) the three semantically consistent, symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes can 
                                                 
5 Pure-strategy equilibria most clearly exemplify the possible differences in message use and in our game the 
exclusion of mixed equilibria does not move the Pareto frontier. Symmetry appears sensible in an environment with 
random anonymous matching where players cannot acquire role distinctions. Semantic consistency is focal and 
given that the two messages in our game are equally costly is not restrictive in terms of payoffs. 
6 One plausible reason for sending message “1” might be other-regarding preferences. A player who intends to take 
action 1 is materially unaffected by whether the other player takes action 2, but the other player would suffer a 
payoff loss in that instance. Thus, a player who intends to take action 1 and has altruistic concerns for the other 
player may want to let the other player know about his intentions by sending message “1.” This suggests that players 
sending message “1” will tend to play action 1 in the game. 7 
 
also be ranked in terms of efficiency. Coordination on (1,1) without messages (supported by 
actions N21 and N11) is the least efficient equilibrium outcome, yielding both players a payoff of 
800. Using message “2” to coordinate on (2,2) (supported by actions M22 and M21), which is 
efficient when c = 0 as in Cooper et al.’s experiment with costless communication, is now also 
inefficient as it yields both players a payoff of 1000-c. Efficiency obtains only under tacit 
coordination, when players do not send messages and coordinate on (2,2) (supported by actions 
N22 and N12), yielding payoffs of 1000. 
To understand our selection among these three symmetric and semantically consistent 
pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes, it may be helpful to recount a well-known forward-
induction narrative. Forward induction expresses the idea that players try to use the history of the 
game to infer future play. Specifically, players try to rationalize unexpected moves of other 
players as best as they can.
7 
For concreteness assume that the game is played between Ann and Bob. Ann knows that 
Bob can guarantee a payoff of 800 by selecting “no message” and then taking action 1. With this 
in mind how should she interpret a reasonably costly message “2” from Bob? She might reason 
that since sending a costly message and then taking action 1 is (strictly) dominated by selecting 
“no message” and taking action 1, Bob must expect a higher payoff in the ensuing post-
communication subgame than 800. The only way for Bob to achieve a payoff greater than 800, 
after sending a message, is to take action 2 to obtain a payoff of 1000-c. Hence, Bob’s intention 
must be to take action 2 in the subgame and therefore Ann’s appropriate response to a reasonably 
costly message “2” is to take action 2 herself.  
Taking this one step further, if both Ann and Bob accept this reasoning, then they believe 
that by sending message “2” Bob can guarantee a payoff of 1000-c. Hence, if Ann receives “no 
message” she should believe that Bob expects a payoff of at least 1000-c in the post-
communication subgame. The only way to achieve such a payoff, when ﾠ  ∈ (0,200), is for both 
players to choose action 2. Thus, if Ann receives “no message” she should expect Bob to take 
                                                 
7 The somewhat elusive forward-induction idea likely originated with Elon Kohlberg (according to Battigalli and 
Siniscalchi (2002)) and one of the earliest references is Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Multiple solution concepts 
(strategic stability, iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies, rationalizability, etc.) capture versions of 
forward-induction reasoning. Prior research using the kinds of coordination games we study here similarly 
demonstrates that history can affect equilibrium selection; specifically, having players pay to play the coordination 
game facilitates efficiency (Van Huyck, et al., 1993; Cachon & Camerer, 1996; Crawford & Broseta, 1998). 
However, these results are not entirely consistent with forward induction, nor do they clearly generate predictions 
for our experiment. 8 
 
action 2 and should therefore take action 2 herself. Similarly, reversing the roles of Ann and 
Bob, if Bob receives no message, he should take action 2. On the basis of this argument one 
would predict that, when players can choose whether to send costly messages, both Ann and Bob 
refrain from sending messages and then take action 2. 
Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) demonstrate for a class of games where only one player can 
send a message (or, can “burn money”) that the above type of forward-induction narrative can be 
captured by iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies: At the unique equilibrium outcome 
that remains after iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies no money is burned and the 
player who can send messages achieves his favorite equilibrium outcome.
8  
With two-sided communication, iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies fails to 
capture the forward-induction logic. However, forward induction can be supported using the 
strategic stability concept of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Our analysis in Appendix A 
demonstrates how this approach uniquely selects, for the modified game in Table 2 and for 
reasonable communication costs (  ∈ (0,200)), the efficient equilibrium in which players send 
no messages and select action 2. Further support for this prediction comes from the fact that this 
predicted outcome in our game is the unique outcome that is supported by equilibria belonging to 
a minimal curb (closed under rational behavior) set. Curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991) are sets 
of strategies that are closed under inclusion of best replies and minimal curb sets frequently 
capture the forward-induction property.
9 
Based on these observations, we predict that in our experiment, with the option to send 
reasonably costly messages (  ∈ (0,200)), the modal behavior will be for players not to send 
messages and to take action 2 (Hypothesis 1). Given that Cooper et al. (1992) and others found 
coordination difficult to achieve without pre-play messages, this theoretical hypothesis is of 
special interest.  
The curb concept can also be used to address equilibrium selection when messages are 
costless (c = 0). Blume (1998) shows that, with multi-sided pre-play communication, if the 
underlying game has a unique efficient action profile then under a mild behavioral assumption 
(that agreement on an equilibrium action profile confers an infinitesimal payoff boost to that 
                                                 
8 Huck and Mueller (2005) find some, although not overwhelming, support for the forward-induction prediction in a 
variant of the battle of the sexes where one of the players is given the opportunity to burn money before the game. 
9 Hurkens (1996) uses the minimal curb notion to obtain a very powerful result for environments in which a subset 
of players can send costly messages (burn money) before a game is played: All players who can burn money obtain 
their favorite equilibrium outcome and no money is burned in equilibrium. 9 
 
profile) every strategy profile in the unique minimal curb retract is an efficient equilibrium. 
Based on this, we predict that in our experiment, with the option to send costless messages (c = 
0), the modal behavior will be for players to send message “2” and to take action 2 (Hypothesis 
2). That is, we expect to replicate the findings of Cooper et al. (1992) in this environment. 
We next consider the case with unreasonably costly messages (  > 200). Here, the above 
forward induction intuition and analysis fail because 1000-c < 800, which means that sending a 
message, regardless of the outcome in the second-stage subgame, is strictly dominated by not 
sending a message and selecting action 1. That is, all of the “M” strategies in Table 2 are strictly 
dominated. Thus, to return to our earlier example, the absence of a message from Bob tells Ann 
nothing about what Bob intends to do, as he would never send a message. The elimination of all 
strategies that employ messages reduces the game to the game in Table 1. Prior research, e.g., 
Cooper, et al. (1992), indicates that behavior in this game will converge to the inefficient (1,1) 
equilibrium.  Therefore, we predict that in our experiment, with unreasonably costly messages 
(  > 200)), the modal behavior will be for players not to send messages and to take action 1 
(Hypothesis 3).  
We make the same prediction for the treatment in which messages are not possible, and 
message costs are therefore implicitly infinite. That is, we predict that in our experiment, with 
no messages, the modal behavior will be for players to take action 1 (Hypothesis 4). As with 
Hypothesis 2, this essentially predicts a replication of Cooper, et al. (1992). 
It is also worth noting here that the minimal curb requirement combined with Blume's 
(1998) behavioral assumption, which we use above to provide a prediction for the treatment with 
costless communication, also yields a prediction for the treatment with reasonably costly 
communication. In both cases the unique minimal curb set supports only efficient outcomes, 
which is consistent with our above predictions: With reasonably costly messages no message is 
sent and action 2 is taken (Hypothesis 1); with costless messages, message 2 is sent and action 2 
is taken (Hypothesis 2). Without messages or with messages that are so costly as to be dominated 
actions, the behavioral assumption is of no consequence, and the minimal curb condition does 
not discriminate between the two strict equilibria of the underlying game. It is worth noting that 
these predictions are obtained without invoking either of our earlier restrictions to pure strategies 
or to equilibrium outcomes that are supported by pure strategies. The semantic consistency 10 
 
condition also disappears, but Blume's behavioral assumption makes reference to the literal 
meaning of messages and thus is in a similar spirit.
10 
Our predictions are in terms of modal behavior and do not explicitly account for noise 
that will likely exist in the data. A solution concept that explicitly incorporates noise is Quantal 
Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In a Quantal Response Equilibrium 
(QRE), players choose strategies probabilistically, assigning higher probability to strategies with 
higher payoffs. For comparison purposes we examined the limit behavior of QRE as we trace 
equilibria continuously from complete noise to no noise.
11 We conduct the analysis for the three 
levels of costs, c = 10, and c = 100 and c = 300, that we introduce in the experiment. We find 
that in the 8x8 game in Table 2 (limit) QRE predicts that action 1 is taken with no message, 
regardless of message costs. This contrasts with the forward-induction logic that guides our 
predictions and which discriminates between treatments with different message costs.
12 
With these hypotheses in mind, we proceed to our experimental test. 
 
III. Experimental Design  
The experiment is modeled after Cooper et al. (1992), in which subjects played the game 
in Table 1 both with and without communication.
13 The experiment was conducted at the 
University of Pittsburgh’s Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL). Each session in our 
study consisted of ten different subjects, recruited by email from Carnegie Mellon University, 
the University of Pittsburgh and the surrounding community.  
                                                 
10 Being able to dispense with the symmetry and pure-strategy outcome restrictions is reassuring because, while they 
helped us highlight some of the central strategic considerations players face in our game, they are not entirely 
innocuous. For example, permitting outcomes that are supported only by mixed equilibria changes the leverage that 
strategic stability has in the analysis. Specifically, the game in Table 2 has a singleton strategically stable 
equilibrium in which both players mix over M22 and N21. In this equilibrium each player faces a tradeoff between 
the cost of guaranteeing efficient continuation play and the risk of both players failing to send a message. 
11 We do so using the GAMBIT software developed by McKelvey, McLennan and Turocy (2007). 
12 We also considered another approach to modeling bounded rationality in games (Level-k), which prior analysis 
finds can account for the findings of many experiments using communication in coordination games (Ellingsen and 
Ostling, 2010). We find that the model does not adequately explain our results. Particularly, it does not account for 
(2,2) play with no messages. The analysis is available from the authors, on request.  
13 Other than the treatment differences, our design choices generally follow those of Cooper, et al., with the 
exception that we simplified the procedure where possible and also modified the design to collect more data. For 
example, instead of using 11 subjects with one excluded each period, we used 10 subjects. Instead of 11 practice 
rounds of a dominant strategy game followed by 22 real rounds, we included no practice rounds and 40 real rounds. 
Instead of each subject being matched with every other subject exactly twice (in random order), we used random 
matching. And finally, instead of a payoff procedure that involved a lottery, we converted all earnings in ECU 
directly into U.S. dollars (with an exchange rate that kept the numerical payoffs in the stage game consistent with 
Cooper et al.). 11 
 
  At the beginning of a session, players sat at separate computers and read instructions on 
the screen as they were read aloud by the experimenter.
14 Before playing the game, every 
participant completed a quiz to verify understanding of payoffs, communication rules, and the 
matching procedure. The experimenter answered questions privately. 
 
Experimental Conditions 
The five conditions are summarized in Table 3, which also presents the relevant cost 
parameter, c, for each condition. We also include our theoretical predictions. 
We conducted a no communication baseline (No Messages) in which subjects played the 
game repeatedly with re-matching after every period. In this treatment, participants played the 
one-shot stag hunt game in Table 1 for forty periods. The payoffs in Table 1 corresponded to 
“Experimental Currency Units” (ECU), and were converted to dollars at the end of the 
experiment at the known exchange rate of $1 per 2500 ECU. Each period, participants were 
anonymously and randomly re-matched, played the one-shot game, and saw the results of that 
period. In every period after the first, players saw the history of their own prior plays of the game 
(own choice, opponent’s choice and resulting outcome), but did not know the identity or history 
of their current opponent. 
Our four conditions with messages depart from Cooper et al.’s design in two main ways, 
consistent with our analysis in Section II. First, we allowed subjects to choose whether to send a 
message. Therefore, in a Costless Messages condition subjects chose at the beginning of each 
period whether to send a costless message to their opponent. Payoffs were not directly affected 
by this choice. Subjects selected either “no message”, “1”, or “2”, by clicking on one of the three 
options on a screen. After every subject made this choice, and corresponding opponents were 
informed of the message choice, subjects proceeded to play the game in Table 1. While this 
treatment differs slightly from Cooper et al.’s two-way communication treatment, in which 
messages were costless but subjects were required to send messages, we expect the two 
treatments to be quite similar in that there is little reason for subjects in our Costless Messages 
condition not to send messages. This prediction is also consistent with our Hypothesis 2. 
Our second modification is more important. We include three conditions in which 
messages are costly, meaning that a player’s payoff from Table 1 was decreased by a cost, c, if 
                                                 
14 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions are 
available in Appendix B. 12 
 
that player chose to send a message to her opponent. There was no cost if a player chose not to 
send a message, and subjects always observed, at no cost, any message from the opponent. 
Subjects made their choices in exactly the same manner as in the Costless Messages condition, 
except that now the cost of sending a message, in ECU, was presented next to the possible 
message choices “1” and “2”, while the “no message” option explicitly indicated no cost.  
Our three costly communication conditions varied the cost associated with sending a 
message. In two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages (  ∈ (0,200)), RC-10 and RC-
100, sending a message cost 10 and 100 ECU, respectively. In a condition with Unreasonably 
Costly messages (c > 200), UC-300, sending a message cost 300 ECU. Our analysis predicts 
different behavior for the two kinds of message costs, as presented in Table 3. 
 
IV. Results   
  We conducted three sessions each of the Costless Messages and No Messages conditions, 
seven sessions each of the two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages, RC-10 and RC-100, 
and five sessions of the condition with Unreasonably Costly messages (UC-300), using a total of 
250 subjects. In our analysis, we explore several different characteristics of the results, including 
the sending of messages, aggregate action choices and outcomes, individual behavior, and 
earnings. 
 
A. Message Use 
   The first question we ask is how message costs affected the frequency of message use. 
Recall that our analysis predicted that message “2” would be very frequent with Costless 
Messages but less frequent in the three conditions with Costly Messages (see Table 3). 
  We find that message costs strongly affect message use. Under Costless Messages, 
message “2” was sent 89.3 percent of the time. However, with message costs, far fewer messages 
were sent: the frequency of message “2” was 24.4 percent for c = 10, 11.3 percent for c = 100, 
and 4.8 percent for c = 300.
15 Thus, the data generally support our predictions concerning 
message use – message “2” is used very frequently with Costless Messages, but rarely in all 
                                                 
15 As expected, message “1” was sent very rarely (never more than 1.2 percent of the time in any condition). In a 
large majority of these cases (86 percent), subjects followed a message of “1” by playing action 1, and no subject 
sent message “1” and subsequently chose action 2 more than one time in the forty periods. These observations 
generally support the assumption of semantic consistency and elimination of message “1” in the analysis. 13 
 
conditions with Costly Messages. 
  Table 4 reports probit regressions, with subject random effects, using the choice to send 
message “2” as the dependent variable. The regressions use only data from the four treatments in 
which messages were possible. As model 1 reveals, the frequency of message use is significantly 
lower in all Costly Message conditions, relative to the condition with Costless Messages.
16 Thus, 
message costs – even very small ones as in RC-10 – significantly decrease message use.
17  
  To explore possible heterogeneity in message use across subjects, Figure 1 shows the 
distributions of message frequency by subject in each of the four conditions with 
communication. Each graph shows, for a particular condition, how often each subject sent 
message “2”, represented on the horizontal axis, ranging from never (0) to doing so in every 
period (1). The vertical axis presents the frequency of each particular message use profile in that 
condition. When messages were Costless, a large majority of subjects sent message “2” in every 
period.
18 However, in the three Costly message conditions, the modal behavior was to send no 
messages at all.  
  While we find, as we predicted, that subjects used messages far less frequently in the 
Costly Message conditions, there exists a possibility that this difference surfaced over the course 
of the experiment, and that subjects in all conditions initially sent messages with high frequency, 
but stopped doing so in the Costly conditions. The data reject this interpretation. As model 2 in 
Table 4 reveals, there is no significant trend in message “2” use across periods in any condition, 
while model 3 reveals that message use was significantly lower under costly messages when 
considering only the first period. Additionally, the frequency of message “2” is never much 
higher in any period of the Costly message conditions than the corresponding aggregate 
frequencies above – the highest frequency of message “2” use in any period is 34.2 percent in 
                                                 
16 In a more conservative statistical test, we calculate the frequency of message “2” use in a session and use this 
session-level statistic as the unit of observation in a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test of differences across 
conditions. The difference in frequency of message “2” use between the Costless Message condition and either RC-
10, RC-100, or UC-300 is statistically significant (respectively, z = 2.39, p < 0.02; z = 2.39, p < 0.02; and z = 2.24, p 
< 0.03). Among the conditions with Costly Messages, only the difference between RC-10 and UC-300 is statistically 
significant (z = 2.36, p < 0.02).  
17 The coefficients for the three Costly Message conditions in model 1 differ significantly and are ordered such that 
fewer messages are used as costs increase. While our predictions do not account for any differences between the 
three treatments with costly messages, it is not entirely surprising to find fewer messages with higher costs. 
18 Three subjects in Costless Messages rarely or never sent message “2” even though doing so was costless. One of 
these subjects had poor vision and experienced difficulty reading the screen and clicking on the radio buttons. The 
other two repeatedly played action 1, and sent the corresponding message (perhaps out of altruism as mentioned in 
footnote 6). 14 
 
RC-10, 17.1 percent in RC-100, and 12 percent in UC-300 – and it is never lower than 83.3 
percent in any period of the Costless Messages condition.  
  The message use by subjects in the experiment therefore strongly confirms our 
predictions in Table 3. Whether on aggregate, by individual subject, or across periods, costless 
messages are used with very high frequency, while costly messages are used rarely. 
 
B. Actions in the Stag Hung Game 
  We now consider the second part of the predictions in Table 3, that the modal behavior in 
the post-message subgame should be action 2 when messages are Costless or Reasonably Costly 
(RC-10 and RC-100) and action 1 when messages are either Unreasonably Costly (UC-300) or 
there are No Messages. Figure 2 presents the frequency of action 2 choices across periods, 
separately for each treatment.  
  Under No Messages and Costless Messages, we expected to replicate the findings in 
Cooper et al. (1992), who found efficient coordination rare when pre-play communication was 
not possible but frequent under costless communication. This is also generally the case in our 
data. Action 2 was chosen only 42 percent of the time with No Messages, and only 30 percent of 
the time in the final ten periods.
19 With Costless Messages, we predicted that a high frequency of 
message “2” would support a high frequency of action 2 choices. Having already observed a high 
frequency of “2” messages, the 87 percent of choices of action 2 further corroborates our 
prediction. Therefore, we find support for Hypotheses 2 and 4.  
  We next consider Reasonably Costly messages (  ∈ (0,200)). Despite the low frequency 
of message use in these conditions, we observe high frequencies of action 2 in both RC-10 (83 
percent) and RC-100 (76 percent), and these are similar to the frequency observed with Costless 
Messages (87 percent). In fact, by the final 10 periods action 2 was selected between 80 and 83 
percent of the time in all three of the conditions where we predicted a high frequency of that 
action, despite the very different frequencies of messages. Thus, combining the frequency of 
messages and action 2 choices in the treatments with Reasonably Costly messages, we find 
strong support for our main prediction (Hypothesis 1). The availability of optional, and 
                                                 
19 There is some heterogeneity across sessions, particularly in the No Messages condition (see Figure 6). In two 
sessions, convergence to action 1 occurred as predicted, while in the remaining No Message session behavior 
converged to action 2. Therefore, coordination on the inefficient game equilibrium (1,1) is weaker than that 
observed by Cooper et al. (1992), though we find it to be the case in two of three sessions. Some procedural 
differences between the two experiments may explain the disparity (see footnote 13). 15 
 
reasonably costly, pre-play messages seems sufficient to obtain a high frequency of efficient 
coordination – subjects do not actually have to use the messages. 
  Finally, we consider the condition with Unreasonably Costly messages, UC-300, where 
we predicted the modal choice in the stag hunt game would be action 1 (Hypothesis 3). The data 
also confirm this prediction: action 2 is selected 28 percent of the time in this treatment, and this 
frequency converges downward over the course of the experiment. Thus, while message use was 
infrequent in all conditions with Costly messages, forgone messages only facilitated efficient 
coordination in the two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages, as we predicted. 
  Table 5 reports random-effects probit regressions that use as the dependent variable 
whether a subject chose action 2 in a period. The first model confirms our predictions regarding 
behavior across treatments: action 2 is chosen significantly more frequently with Costless or 
Reasonably Costly Messages, than with either No Messages (the omitted category) or 
Unreasonably Costly Messages. We fail to reject the restriction that the three coefficients for 
Costless Messages, RC-10, and RC-100 are equal (χ
2(2) = 4.32, p = 0.12).  
  Model 2 includes time trends for each condition, and confirms some patterns from Figure 
2. For example, the frequency of action 2 decreases across periods both with No Messages and 
Unreasonably Costly Messages, and the decrease is larger with the latter. More importantly, in 
model 2 the intercepts and time trends differ for the three remaining conditions (Costless, RC-10 
and RC-100). While the difference between the coefficients for these three intercepts is 
statistically significant (χ
2(2) < 15.50, p < 0.001), the differences in the frequencies of first-
period action 2 choice across these three conditions are small (Costless: 90 percent; RC-10: 79 
percent; RC-100: 80 percent) and none of the pairwise first-period comparisons at the subject 
level are statistically significant (χ
2(1) < 1.83, p >  0.17, in all comparisons). To further explore 
differences in first period behavior, model 4 in Table 5 reports the same regression as model 1, 
but using only first period data. The coefficients for the three conditions in which we predicted a 
high frequency of action 2 choices – Costless Messages and the two conditions with Reasonably 
Costly messages – are positive and significant, jointly significantly different from zero (χ
2(3) = 
11.64, p < 0.01), and do not differ statistically from each other (χ
2(2) = 1.98, p = 0.37). 
  To summarize, our analysis so far strongly confirms all of our hypotheses. Confirming 
prior research, subjects who cannot send messages tend to select action 1 (Hypothesis 4), while 
costless messages facilitate action 2 (Hypothesis 2). However, messages appear unnecessary 16 
 
when they are Reasonably Costly (  ∈ (0,200)), as subjects in these conditions do not send 
messages, yet they select action 2 with frequencies very similar to those under Costless 
messages. The forward-induction argument on which our main prediction is based is supported 
by the fact that, message costs become unreasonable (c > 200), subjects also send few messages 
but modal behavior changes dramatically toward action 1. All of this is supported both when 
considering data from all 40 periods or only the first period. 
 
C. Individual Actions Conditional on Messages 
  Our prior analysis confirms our hypotheses when looking, separately, at message and 
choice behavior. To provide a stronger test, we can also consider these two aspects of a player’s 
strategy jointly. At the root of our main prediction (Hypothesis 1) is that subjects in the 
Reasonably Costly conditions select action 2 with high frequency when they do not receive a 
message from their opponent, but that subjects in the Unreasonably Costly and No Message 
conditions select action 1 in the absence of messages. 
  Figure 3 shows the frequency of action choices 2 (dark shading) and 1 (light shading) 
conditional on a message of “2” being sent or received in each condition.
20 The label above each 
panel presents the message profile, (message sent, message received), indicating both the 
message sent by the subject and the message received from the opponent. The percentages over 
each bar indicate the frequency in that particular condition for that particular message profile. 
For example, the bottom right panel, labeled (2,2), presents instances in which both players sent 
message “2”, which occurred with a frequency of 80 percent under Costless Messages, 8 percent 
in RC-10, 2 percent in RC-100, and never occurred in UC-300 or, of course, under No Messages. 
In this panel, it is apparent that when a player both sent a message and also received a message 
from the opponent, the player chose 2, regardless of message cost (at least for c < 200).  
  Turning to the diagonal panels, in which a subject either sent no message but received 
one (top, right) or sent a message but did not receive one (bottom, left), we find interesting 
differences between the communication treatments. With Costless Messages, such 
                                                 
20 In the few instances in which subjects sent a message of “1” they and their opponents usually subsequently chose 
action 1. This is consistent with subjects who decide to play action 1 in the game and exhibit other-regarding 
preferences towards their opponent (see footnote 6). 17 
 
communication outcomes resulted in fewer than half of subjects playing action 2 subsequently.
21 
In the conditions with Reasonably Costly messages (RC-10 and RC-100), however, the 
proportion of action 2 choices is much higher in both panels, and is close to one. With 
Unreasonably Costly messages, subjects who send such messages (2, none) are highly likely to 
select action 2, but receiving such a message without having sent one (none, 2) yields fewer 
action 2 choices than with Reasonably Costly messages. 
  Most importantly for our purposes, consider the top-left panel, when no messages are 
sent. Under the complete absence of messages, subjects are more likely to choose action 2 when 
sending a message would have been Reasonably Costly (RC-10: 75.5%; RC-100: 71.8%) than 
when sending a message was Unreasonably Costly (22.5%) or simply not possible (42.4%).
22 
Thus, as we hypothesized, the absence of messages results in different action responses based on 
whether sending a message would have been reasonable or possible.  
  To provide statistical evidence that the absence of messages is interpreted differently 
under Reasonably Costly messages than in other conditions, model 3 in Table 5 explores how 
behavior changes across conditions in response to receiving a message of “2” from an opponent.  
Since a subject’s own message is endogenous, we do not include own message as an explanatory 
variable. When including whether a message was received, the coefficient for the Costless 
Message condition becomes statistically insignificant, while the coefficient for Received 
Message “2,” which applies to this condition, becomes positive and statistically significant. This 
shows that simply being in the Costless Message condition does not increase action 2 choice – 
when messages are costless it is also necessary that one’s opponent send a message of “2.” 
However, the coefficients for the two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages are positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that receiving messages is unnecessary in these conditions 
to see an increase in action 2 choice. That is, action 2 choices increase significantly from simply 
being in these conditions, regardless of whether a message of “2” is received, as we 
hypothesized.
23 
                                                 
21 Note that the Costless Messages data in the (none, 2) panel is almost entirely composed of the three subjects with 
irregular message behavior (see footnote 18). The Costless Messages data in the (2, none) panel is composed almost 
entirely of responses to these subjects by their opponents. 
22 The frequency of action choice 2 under Costless Messages in the top-left (none, none) panel is not highly 
informative as this message profile occurred very infrequently. 
23 The negative coefficients on the interaction between the costly message conditions and Message “2” indicate that 
the effect of receiving a message is weaker under costly messages than under costless messages. 18 
 
  Of course, the above analysis pools behavior across all periods and therefore may reflect 
cohort effects and path dependencies. Therefore, to conduct a conservative statistical test of this 
finding, in model 5 we examine behavior in the first period alone, looking at the frequency of 
action 2 choices only in cases where no messages were used by either player.
24 The model 
confirms the above analysis – the absence of any messages yields at least marginally 
significantly more action 2 choices in both conditions with Reasonably Costly messages, relative 
to when messages are not possible, but no significant increase when messages are Unreasonably 
Costly. Thus, even from the first period, subjects who must play the stag hunt game without 
either receiving a message from or sending one to an opponent behave differently depending on 
what type of communication was possible, consistently with our predictions. 
  Figure 4 explores whether responsiveness to messages in the two Reasonably Costly 
message conditions varies across periods. The graphs show the frequency of action 2 choices 
across periods, following either receiving (thin solid line) or not receiving (thick solid line) a 
message. The graphs also show the frequency of message “2.” In both conditions, subjects are 
slightly more likely to select action 2 when they receive a message of “2” from their opponent 
than when they do not, but the frequencies in both cases are quite high. The graphs also reveal 
little change in behavior over time. 
 
D. Outcomes and Earnings 
  We next examine how the above action choices influence the outcomes and subject 
earnings achieved in the five conditions. The upper panel of Figure 5 presents the frequency over 
all forty periods of the three possible game outcomes – (2,2), (1,1), or miscoordination, in which 
action choices differ – by condition; the lower panel does so for the last 10 periods. Consistent 
with Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the above analysis of actions, the modal outcome under Costless or 
Reasonably Costly messages is (2,2). Consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4, the modal outcome 
under No Messages or Unreasonably Costly messages is (1,1). 
Table 6 presents mean subject earnings per period by condition, including any costs 
incurred from sending messages in the three conditions with costly communication. Not 
surprisingly, the mean payoff is low under No Messages or Unreasonably Costly messages, 
                                                 
24 This occurred 40 percent of the time in RC-10, 63 percent in RC-100, 92 percent in UC-300, and (by 
construction) 100 percent of the time under No Messages. The no message case did not occur under Costless 
Messages, where every pair in Period 1 had at least one message, so we omit this condition from the model. 19 
 
which Figure 5 shows also yield the highest frequencies of (1,1) and miscoordination outcomes. 
While Costless Messages yielded higher mean payoffs than either of the Reasonably Costly 
message conditions over the entire experiment, these differences decreased over time. In fact, 
mean payoffs over the last ten periods are very similar under RC-100 and under Costless 
Messages.
25 
Table 7 presents OLS regressions, using a subject’s mean payoff, including message 
costs, across all periods as the unit of observation and including session random effects. The first 
model simply shows the treatment differences. Mean payoffs are significantly higher under 
Costless or Reasonably Costly messages, relative to the No Messages baseline. Mean payoffs are 
slightly lower under Unreasonably Costly messages, but this difference is not statistically 
significant.  
Model 2 considers how a subject’s message use affects earnings. The variable 
“Frequency of Message Use” is the proportion of periods in which a subject sent message “2” – 
i.e., 0 for a subject who never sent messages and 1 for a subject who sent message “2” in every 
period (this statistic is analogous to the one reported in Figure 1). The first coefficient for this 
variable measures the effect of message use under Costless Messages, while the remaining 
interaction variables measure the marginal effect for the corresponding condition. As model 2 
reveals, subjects in the Costless Message condition earned more than those in the (omitted) No 
Messages condition only if they regularly sent messages. However, in the two conditions with 
Reasonably Costly messages, even subjects who never sent messages earned more, and there was 
little additional benefit from sending messages. Not surprisingly, subjects earned considerably 
less if they sent Unreasonably Costly messages. 
 
E. Heterogeneity Across Sessions 
  Most of our prior analysis aggregates behavior across sessions, which may hide between-
session heterogeneity. We present in Figure 6 results from the individual sessions for each 
                                                 
25 As illustrated by the lower panel of Figure 5, the relatively low profits in RC-10 relative to RC-100 in the last ten 
periods, despite the similarity in action choices (see  
Table 4) are due to the higher frequency of miscoordination (17.4% in RC-10 vs. 4.0% in RC-100: z = 2.125, p < 
0.05, M-W with average earnings in a session as the unit of analysis). Only one of the RC-10 sessions had less than 
10% miscoordination over the last ten periods while only one of the RC-100 sessions had more than 10% 
miscoordination over the last ten periods. While this observation is entirely post-hoc, we speculate that the size of 
the costs may affect the degree to which common understanding arises regarding whether the absence of a message 
implies action 1 or 2. 20 
 
condition. The horizontal axis indicates the frequency of message “2” in a session, while the 
vertical axis indicates the frequency of action 2. The gridlines divide the graph into quadrants, 
three of which correspond to predicted message and action frequencies from our hypotheses (see 
Table 3):
26 low message frequency and high action 2 frequency under Reasonably Costly 
messages (H1), high message frequency and high action 2 frequency under Costless Messages 
(H2), low message frequency and low action 2 frequency under Unreasonably Costly (H3) or No 
Messages (H4). With few exceptions the sessions within a particular condition lie in the 
appropriate quadrant – the exceptions are: one RC-10 session had slightly more than 0.5 message 
frequency (0.51), one RC-100 session had a low action 2 frequency (0.35), and one session with 
No Messages obtained a high frequency of action 2 (0.85, see footnote 19). But the remaining 22 
sessions all lie in the appropriate quadrant, providing strong support for our predictions. All but 
two (of 14) sessions with Reasonably Costly messages had both message frequencies below 0.44 
and action 2 frequencies above 0.56, and five sessions in these conditions had both message 
frequencies below 0.04 and action 2 frequencies above 0.90 (these are the sessions clustered 
towards the top left of the graph). Meanwhile, no session with Unreasonably Costly messages 
obtained an action 2 frequency greater than 0.3. Thus, while there is some heterogeneity at the 
session level, the behavior in a large majority of sessions generally conforms to our predictions. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  We present novel experimental results that address how economic agents resolve 
coordination problems and the role communication plays in obtaining efficient equilibrium 
selection. Prior research suggests that, where efficient coordination is difficult, explicit pre-play 
communication provides a natural solution. Thus, based on this research, one might expect to see 
people regularly communicating whenever coordination problems like the stag-hunt game arise. 
Our research presents a significant departure from such conventional wisdom.  
We begin by recognizing that, in many real-world organizational and economic contexts, 
explicit communication is costly. Scheduling a meeting or holding a conference call require 
using resources, and agents often must decide whether they are willing to bear these costs. 
                                                 
26 To account for possible noise in the data, our hypotheses state predictions in terms of modal behavior. More 
precise predictions correspond to the corner in each quadrant where message and action frequencies are either 0 or 1. 21 
 
Therefore, relying on messages to facilitate efficient coordination of actions creates inefficiency 
– it would be better to obtain the same outcome without costly explicit communication. 
Our analysis and results show that, when communication costs are explicitly included as 
part of message use, people no longer use messages but nevertheless coordinate their actions 
efficiently in the second-stage game. That is, rather than requiring people faced with stag-hunt-
like real-world coordination problems to regularly and extensively communicate to reassure one 
another about their intended actions – as prior experimental evidence suggests one should solve 
these kinds of coordination problems – our results indicate that it might be sufficient for people 
to know that the other party could have communicated, if she thought it was necessary. Our 
theoretical analysis supports this intuition, by appealing to the concept of forward induction.  
The results of our experiment are conclusive in supporting our theoretical predictions. 
For reasonably costly messages – i.e., messages that one would be willing to send if they 
facilitated efficient coordination – players do not send such messages and yet appear to draw the 
necessary strategically reassuring inference from the fact that such messages could have been 
sent. As a consequence, we observe high frequencies of efficient coordination in the stag hunt 
game merely by players knowing that they could have used costly messages, without them 
actually having to use them. This suggests that explicit, and costly, communication may be far 
less necessary and prevalent in economic and organizational contexts resembling the stag hunt 
game than prior research suggests. 
The results of a condition with unreasonably costly messages – which are so high that 
sending messages constitutes a dominated strategy – provide critical support for our predictions. 
In this condition, almost every factor is identical to that under reasonably costly messages (e.g., 
the presence of a message technology, the interface and instructions seen by subjects), except the 
message cost exceeds a threshold that our analysis shows is critical for the kind of forward-
induction based inference that drives our main prediction. The fact that the results are clearly 
different between reasonably and unreasonably costly messages – subjects do not use messages 
in either case, but coordinate efficiently in the former but not in the latter – supports our 
argument that it is the inference subjects draw from unsent messages that is critical for our main 
result. 
  Our results also highlight the need to think critically about how important features of the 
real world can be incorporated into laboratory experiments, and how such inclusion can 22 
 
substantively alter the resulting inference one draws from an experiment. Based on prior findings 
one might assume that the best way to resolve difficult coordination problems is to encourage 
pre-play communication. But this conventional wisdom ignores the impact of communication 
costs, which make explicit communication inefficient. Our findings suggest that equally 
effective, and less costly, is to create the possibility of communication, highlight the fact that it is 
costly, and note that agents can always use it if they think it necessary.  23 
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Table 1: Stag Hunt Game 
    Column Player’s 
Action 
    1  2 
Row Player’s 
Action 
1  800, 800  800, 0 






Table 2: Communication Game with One Costly Message 
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Table 3: Experimental Conditions 
 
Communication Condition  Message Cost 
(in ECU) 
Prediction 
(message “2”, action) 
Costless Messages  c = 0  message, action 2 (H2) 
Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-10)  c = 10 
no message, action 2 (H1) 
Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-100)  c = 100 
Unreasonably Costly Messages (UC-300)  c = 300  no message, action 1 (H3) 
No Messages  -  action 1 (H4) 27 
 
 
Table 4: Random-effects Probit Regressions of Message “2” Use 
 
 
Dependent variable: Subject sent message “2” 
 
All periods  Period 1 
(1)  (2)  (3) 



























Period    0.006 
(0.008)   
Period X Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-10)    0.001 
(0.009)   
Period X Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-100)    0.002 
(0.009)   
Period X Unreasonably Costly Messages (UC-300)    -0.006 










       
Observations  8800  8800  220 
Number of subjects  220  220  220 
Log Likelihood  -1884.94  -1880.18  -92.13 
 
Both models include data from all conditions with messages and subject random effects 
Standard errors in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01  
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Table 5: Probit Regressions of Action Choice 2 in Stag-Hunt Subgame 
 
Dependent variable: 
Subject chose action 2 
All periods      Period 1  Period 1 & 
no messages 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 

























































Period    -0.046
*** 
(0.005)       
Period X Costless 
Messages    0.020
** 
(0.008)       
Period X RC-10    0.049
*** 
(0.006)       
Period X RC-100    0.059
*** 
(0.006)       
Period X UC-300    -0.023
*** 
(0.007)       
Received Message “2” 
(Costless Messages)      2.366*** 
(0.198)     
Received Message “2”  
X RC-10      -0.848*** 
(0.233)     
Received Message “2”  
X RC-100      -0.173 
(0.250)     
Received Message “2”  
X UC-300      -0.745
*** 
(0.249)     










Observations  10000  10000  10000  250  148 
Number of subjects  250  250  250  250  148 
Log Likelihood  -3500.49  -3233.64  -3096.57  -136.18  -91.24 
Models 1 through 4 include data from all conditions; model 5 omits Costless Messages; models 1 through 3 include 
subject random effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01  29 
 
Table 6: Mean Payoff per Period (Including Message Costs) 
 













All 40 Periods  932  858  868  698  766 
Last 10 Periods  923  875  926  758  813 
 
 
Table 7: Determinants of Mean Payoffs (OLS) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Mean profit for a subject   (1)  (2) 





















Frequency of Message Use    143.89
*** 
(37.19) 
Frequency of Message Use X RC-10    -73.20
* 
(44.19) 
Frequency of Message Use X RC-100    -186.53
*** 
(52.69) 









Observations  250  250 
Number of sessions  25  25 
R
2  0.422  0.558 
All models include data from all conditions and session random effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01 30 
 
 








Figure 3: Choices Conditional on (Message Sent, Message Received) 
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Appendix A: Analysis of Strategic Stability 
 
We will make use of the following facts about stable sets of equilibria that were 
established by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). First, there exists a stable set that is contained in a 
single closed connected component of the set of Nash equilibria. Second, stable sets satisfy 
iterated dominance, i.e. a stable set contains a stable set of any game obtained by deleting a 
dominated strategy; and third, stable sets satisfy the never weak best reply property, i.e. a stable 
set contains a stable set of any game that is obtained by deleting a strategy that is not a best reply 
against any equilibrium in the set. 
We investigate which, if any, of the three equilibrium outcomes of interest is supported 
by a stable set of equilibria that belongs to a single closed connected component of the set of 
Nash equilibria. Consider the 8x8 reduced normal form of the game where players have a choice 
to either send no message or a message of “2” with cost   ∈ (0,200) before playing the 2x2 base 
game. This game is described in Table 2 in the paper.  
The outcome where players send message 2 and take action 2 is supported by the closed 
connected component of equilibria in which players play (possibly degenerate) mixtures of the 
strategies M22 and M21 and where the probability p with which M22 is played satisfies 
  ∈ 0,(1000 −  )/1000 . Call this the 2-2 component. The 2-2 component is not stable: For 
both players, strategy M11 is weakly dominated and strategies M12, N12 and N11 are not weak 
best replies against any strategy in the 2-2 component. In the game that remains when these 
strategies are deleted, the strategy M21 is weakly dominated (by M22). But the game that 
remains once M21 is deleted does not have an equilibrium that belongs to the 2-2 component.  
The outcome where players send no message and take action 1 is supported by the closed 
connected component of equilibria in which players play (possibly degenerate) mixtures of the 
strategies N21 and N11 and where the probability q with which N21 is played satisfies 
  ∈ 0,(800 +  )/1000 . Call this the N-1 component. The N-1 component is not stable: For 
both players strategy M11 is weakly dominated and strategies M21, N22 and N12 are not weak 
best replies against any strategy in the N-1 component. In the game that results once these 
strategies are eliminated, the strategy N11 is weakly dominated (by N21). Once this strategy has 
been removed, the resulting game does not have a Nash equilibrium in the N-1 component. 35 
 
The outcome where players send no message and take action 2 is supported by the closed 
connected component of equilibria in which players play arbitrary (possibly degenerate) 
mixtures of the strategies N22 and N12. Call this the N-2 component. The N-2 component is 
stable: Regardless of how players mix over the strategies N22 and N12, any best reply to such a 
mixture is one of those two strategies or a mixture thereof. Therefore, for any perturbation of the 
game there is an equilibrium in which players put maximal weight on strategy N22, strategy N12 
or a combination of the two. 
In summary, among pure-strategy, symmetric and semantically consistent equilibrium 
outcomes in the game with reasonable communication costs (  ∈ (0,200)), only the one in 
which no message is sent and players take action 2 belongs to a stable connected component of 
equilibria. 
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Appendix B: Instructions (RC-10 Condition) 
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